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strued to include the gestor's services? Apparently the court
could justify an affirmative answer by looking to the French
jurisprudence and holding that where the gestor renders professional or technical services in the ordinary lines of his profession or trade these services may be regarded as a reasonable and
necessary expense.36 Second, should his services be regarded as
voluntary? Apparently so, under the holding of Weber v. Granguard. The fact that the gestor acted at the request of one who
in fact had no authority should make no difference. The third
question and undoubtedly the most difficult is: should an attorney be allowed to undertake, of his own accord, the management
of another's affairs. The Civil Code makes no distinction between an attorney and any other gestor; however, the Canons of
Professional Ethics provide that an attorney should not voluntarily impose his service upon another. Under the fund doctrine
an attorney must have been employed by at least one interested
party,8 7 but the articles on negotiorum gestio have no such limitation. It is submitted that since the law is adequately expressed
as to this point the court might decide the case within the bounds
8
of the code articles on the management of another's affairs.
However, since the legal profession has chosen to limit the capacity of its members to act as gestors, the court should consider
this and apply the articles only when the attorney has acted at
the request of a third party, as in the Weber case; or when the
circumstances are such, as in the instant case, that if no action is
taken the group would stand to lose the entire fund.
Gordon A. Pugh

TORTS -

DUTY OF OCCUPIER TO SOCIAL GUESTS

Plaintiff brought an action to recover damages sustained
when she slipped on a rug in the home of her son-in-law. The
plaintiff was a guest in the home and she brought this action
against the son-in-law's insurer. The rug sometimes stretched,
thereby causing it to slip or wrinkle. The plaintiff maintained
that the host negligently maintained premises unsafe for his
36. Under the French holdings on negotiorum gestio and the French doctrine
as applied at common law, recovery would be the same as the reasonable value of
the attorney's services. See note 19 supra and page 903 supra.
37. See page 901 supra.
38. See note 35 supra.
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NOTES

guests. The lower court dismissed the suit. On appeal the court
of appeal held, affirmed. The defendant owed the social guest a
duty to use reasonable care to ascertain that the premises were
safe, although under the facts of the case recovery was precluded.1 Alexander v. General Accident Fire and Life Assurance
Company, 98 So.2d 730 (La. App. 1957).
Traditionally persons who come upon the land of others fall
into one of three categories: trespassers, licensees, or invitees.
The trespasser comes upon the land without permission of the
occupier 2 and no duty is owed except not to injure him intentionally or wantonly.3 A licensee is one who comes upon the premises
with the express or implied permission of the occupier but not
for any purpose of the occupier. 4 The occupier has a duty to
warn the licensee of any dangerous conditions which are actually
known to him. 5 The third group, is that of the invitee who enters
with the express or implied permission of the occupier but for
some business reason or for the mutual advantages of the parties.6 To the invitee the occupier owes the duty to use reasonable
care to learn of any dangerous conditions on the premises and
either to make the premises safe or to warn the invitee of the
danger. 7 Some courts have held that the purpose for which the
invitee enters must be a pecuniary one.8 It is said that this is/
the price which the occupier must pay when people come upon
his premises for his potential economic gain. 9 However, many
cases have held the occupier liable whenever the occupier en1. The mother-in-law had been in the home for five weeks and was fairly
familiar with the conditions in the house. The court found that she was contributorily negligent because of her knowledge of the dangerous rug. If the guest knows
of the dangerous condition, the occupier owes the guest no duty to make the
premises safe.
2. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 329 (1934).
3. Id. § 333; PROSSER, TORTS § 76 (2d ed. 1955).
4. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § § 330, 331 (1934).
5. Id. § 342.
6. Id. §§ 331, 332; PROSSER, TORTS § 78 (2d ed. 1955). The Restatement
categorizes the three classes of persons who come upon the premises of another as
trespassers, gratuitous licensees and business guests. Section 331 defines licensees
as those who enter the premises with permission, but who do not qualify as business guests. In Section 332 business guests are defined as persons who are invited or permitted to remain on another's land for a purpose directly or indirectly
concerned with business dealings between them.
7. Indermaur v. Dames, L.R. 1 C.P. 274, aff'd, L.R. 2 C.P. (1860) ; PROSSER,
TORTS § 78 (2d ed. 1955) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 343 (1934).
8. RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 332, 343, Comment a (1934). The pecuniary theory is adhered to in the Restatement. Courts which adopted this theory have often
found some rather peculiar pecuniary situations. See, e.g., Ward v. Avery, 113
Conn. 394, 155 Atl. 502 (1931) (person entered merely to use telephone) ; Campbell v. Weathers, 153 Kan. 316, 111 P.2d 72 (1941).
9. Hl awFa, TORTS § 98 (1933).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XIX

courages people to come on his land for this purpose, and the circumstances are such that there can be found an implied representation that the premises are safe. 10 When the premises are
held open to the public, such a representation is made. The social
guest has not been included as an invitee under either of these
theories but has been designated as a licensee. The courts have
often held that the social guest enters as one of the family and
that he is due no greater care than that owed to a member of
the family. These courts adhere to the idea that one who accepts
the accommodations of a host also accepts the conditions which
are found there." The advocates of this position have suggested
that it accords with the state of mind of the social guest. 12 It has
been suggested that the social guest does not belong in either
the licensee or the invitee class but should be considered separately. 18 However, it was maintained that the duty owed to the
social guest was essentially the same as that owed to a licensee.
In a recent English case it was held that in order to be liable to
the social guest the owner did not have to have actual knowledge
of the danger of the condition, provided that he had actual knowledge of the existence of the condition and that the circumstances
were such that a reasonable man would have realized the danger.1 4 The adoption of this position increases the amount of protection afforded the licensee and yet it maintains a distinction
between the invitee and the licensee. The distinction is that to
the invitee a duty is owed to exercise reasonable care to discover
dangerous conditions on the property while the occupier is liable
to the licensee only for those conditions of which the occupier has
knowledge. Under the English rule the occupier is liable to a
licensee or to an invitee if he has knowledge of the existence of
the condition regardless of whether he appreciates that the condition is dangerous.
In the instant case the court felt that the exclusion of the ex10. Often the application of the economic benefit theory and the implied representation theory will give the same results. However, the implied representation
theory may allow a person without a shadow of a pecuniary interest to recover.
Davis v. Central Congressional Society, 129 Mass. 367, 37 Am. Rep. 368 (1880)
(person injured on church grounds) ; City of Columbia v. Wilks, 166 So. 925
(Miss. 1936) (public swimming pool) ; Caldwell v. Village of Island Park, 304
N.Y. 268, 107 N.E.2d 441 (1952) (public playground).
11. Comeau v. Comeau, 285 Mass. 578, 189 N.E. 588, 92 A.L.R. 1002 (1934);
Indermaur v. Dames, L.R. 1 C.P. 274 (1866) ; Southeote v. Stanley, 1 H. & N.
247, 156 Eng. Rep. 1195 (1856).
12. HARPER, TORTS § 98 (1933).
13. Scheibel v. Lipton, 156 Ohio St. 308, 102 N.E.2d 453 (1951).
14. Hawkins v. Coulsdon and Purley Urban District Council, 1 All Eng. L.R.
97 (1954).
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pressly invited social guest from the protection accorded invitees
was unsound and illogical. The court, feeling that the invitation
theory rather than the pecuniary benefit theory is the general
criterion for the determination of an invitee, stated that it is
illogical to .give greater protection to one expressly invited into
the home for business purposes than to one expressly invited for
social purposes. 15 The duty owed to one on the premises as the
result of an expressed invitation was distinguished from the duty
.owed to one on the premises merely by implied invitation in that
*an express invitation carries with it an implied assurance that
the host has exercised reasonable care for the guest's safety.
*Such a distinction was drawn between permissive use and an express invitation in a Connecticut case. 16 In that case the court
said that mere passive acquiescence by the owner did not place
on him a duty to use reasonable care; but that if the owner
induced another to come onto his land then he represents his
land to be in safe condition and he is liable if he does not exercise reasonable care. In the instant case, although the court ruled
that the plaintiff was owed the duty of reasonable care, recovery
was precluded on the ground that the plaintiff was contributorily
negligent because she had been in the home for five weeks and
should have been familiar with the condition of the rug. The
host is not liable for a condition of which the guest has knowledge or of which he should have knowledge.
The holding of the court would not move all social guests into
the classification of invitees, but only those who come in response
to an express invitation. A duty of exercising reasonable care
would be owed to the expressly invited social guest and no longer
would mere ignorance of the condition by the occupier absolve
him of liability to these guests. From this it appears that social
guests are divided into two categories: (a) the guest who comes
by express invitation and who is accorded the protection of an
invitee, and (b) the guest who comes only by an implied invitation and who remains in the licensee class. There is a question
as to whether according a greater amount of protection to the
expressly invited social guest and denying the increased protection to the impliedly invited guest is justified. It appears that
many guests who come onto the premises without an express invitation should be accorded as great a measure of protection as
15. Laube v. Stevenson, 137 Conn. 469, 78 A.2d 693 (1951). In a dissent by
Judge Jennings it was stated that it seemed illogical that one who enjoys an
express invitation should be denied the protection accorded an invitee.
16. Guilford v. Yale University, 128 Conn. 449, 23 A.2d 917 (1942).
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is the expressly invited guest. Should a friend who drops in for
an afternoon visit be given less protection than an expressly invited guest? It should be considered that the extension of the
protection of reasonable care to the expressly invited social guest
is a rule which the court may have difficulty applying. There
are many situations which would practically defy classification
as being either express or implied invitations. For an example
consider the guest who enters the premises without an express
invitation but who remains on the premises in response to an
express invitation. While in the past cases of guests suing their
hosts were not common, the increasing prevalence of insurance
covering domestic injuries will likely cause an increase in the
number of such suits. An increasing volume of suits coupled
with a rule which is often difficult to apply could burden the
courts with a difficult administrative problem. It seems logical
that all social guests should be owed a duty of reasonable care.
The argument that the social guest merely enters on the same
footing as the family and that he does not expect reasonable care
seems irrational and not in keeping with the true attitude of one
who enters the premises of another as a guest. The burden of
reasonable care is not an onerous one; the owner is not under
absolute liability. It is submitted that the rule that all social
guests should be accorded reasonable care is logical and would
not be difficult to apply. In answer to those who might criticize
the expansion of protection because they feel that it will threaten
a homeowner with financial ruin, it should be pointed out that
insurance will allow the cost to be distributed among all homeowners.
Ben W. Lightfoot

TORTS -

LIABILITY OF A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION -

DUTY To

GIvE ADEQUATE POLICE PROTECTION To INFORMANTS
Plaintiff sued the City of New York for the wrongful death
of his son, who was allegedly killed because of the city's failure
to provide adequate police protection. The deceased, Arnold
Schuster, in response to an FBI poster, had given the city police
information leading to the capture of the notorious criminal
Willie "The Actor" Sutton. Subsequently, Schuster received
numerous anonymous threats. He appealed for and was given
special police protection, but this protection was soon discon-

